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Abstract
For real-world mobile applications such as location-based ad-
vertising and spatial crowdsourcing, a key to success is target-
ing mobile users that can maximally cover certain locations
in a future period. To find an optimal group of users, exist-
ing methods often require information about users’ mobility
history, which may cause privacy breaches. In this paper, we
propose a method to maximize mobile crowd’s future loca-
tion coverage under a guaranteed location privacy protection
scheme. In our approach, users only need to upload one of
their frequently visited locations, and more importantly, the
uploaded location is obfuscated using a geographic differen-
tial privacy policy. We propose both analytic and practical
solutions to this problem. Experiments on real user mobil-
ity datasets show that our method significantly outperforms
the state-of-the-art geographic differential privacy methods
by achieving a higher coverage under the same level of pri-
vacy protection.
Introduction
Crowd coverage maximization is a classical problem in mo-
bile computing: how to selectm users from a candidate pool
to maximize the probability of covering a set of target loca-
tions in a coming time period (e.g., one day or one week).
This problem and its variants have a wide spectrum of ap-
plications in location-based advertising (Dhar and Varsh-
ney 2011), spatial crowdsoucing (Chen and Shahabi 2016;
Zhang et al. 2014), urban computing (Zheng et al. 2014),
etc. For example, it can help shop owners to offer electronic
coupons to the set of mobile app users who may physically
visit the region around the shop soon; it can also help crowd-
sourcing organizers to recruit the participants to cover the
task area with the highest probability (Xiong et al. 2016).
One of the key steps in crowd coverage maximization is
mobility profiling, i.e., predicting the probability of a user
appearing at a certain location. A common practice is first
dividing an area into fine-grained grids or sub-areas, and
then counting the frequency of a user appearing in each
grid based on trajectory history (Guo et al. 2017). One can
use more sophisticated models like Poisson process to es-
timate users’ occurrence distribution (Xiong et al. 2016).
Existing mobility profiling methods often require access to
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users’ historical mobility traces, which may seriously com-
promise user privacy. For example, users’ exposed location
data may reveal sensitive information about their identities
and social relationships (Cho, Myers, and Leskovec 2011;
Rossi et al. 2015). Despite the importance of location pri-
vacy, as far as we know, there is little research effort combin-
ing location privacy, mobility profiling, and crowd coverage
maximization up to date.
To fill this gap, this paper aims to explore how to protect
the crowds’ location privacy, while still optimizing their ex-
pected coverage of a set of locations. To achieve this goal,
we propose a mobile crowd coverage maximization frame-
work with a rigorous privacy protection scheme — geo-
graphic differential privacy (Andre´s et al. 2013). A geo-
graphic differential privacy policy obfuscates a user’s ac-
tual location to another with carefully designed probabili-
ties, such that adversaries, regardless of their prior knowl-
edge, can learn little about the user’s true location after ob-
serving the obfuscated locations. However, with differential
privacy protection, crowd coverage maximization can only
be performed based on the obfuscated (inaccurate) locations,
which leads to inevitable loss of the quality of the selected
users. Therefore, we propose a method to generate the op-
timal location obfuscation policy which satisfies geographic
differential privacy while minimizing such loss.
In summary, this paper has the following contributions:
(1) To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
studying the mobile crowd coverage maximization problem
with location privacy protection.
(2) In our approach, users only need to upload one of
their frequently visited locations, and more importantly, the
uploaded location is obfuscated using the rigorous privacy
policy — geographic differential privacy. We further formu-
late an optimization problem to obtain the optimal obfus-
cation policy that can maximize the expected future crowd
coverage over a set of locations under a guaranteed level of
differential privacy protection. As the optimization problem
is non-convex, we first mathematically analyze the scenario
when only one location needs to cover and then derive an
optimal solution. Then, we extend this setting to the multi-
location coverage scenario and propose a practical algorithm
to obtain the optimal obfuscation policy.
(3) Experiments on real human mobility datasets verify
that, by selecting the same number of users under the same
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level of privacy protection, our method achieves a higher
coverage than state-of-the-art differential privacy methods.
Preliminaries
Geographic differential privacy (Andre´s et al. 2013) intro-
duces the idea of database differential privacy (Dwork 2008)
into the location obfuscation context. Its key idea is: given
an observed obfuscated location l∗, any two locations l1 and
l2 have similar probabilities of being mapped to l∗. It is thus
hard for an adversary to differentiate whether the user is at
l1 or l2 by observing l∗.
Definition 1 (Andre´s et al. 2013). Suppose the target area
includes a set of locations L, then an obfuscation policy P
satisfies geographic -differential privacy, iff.
P (l∗|l1) ≤ ed(l1,l2)P (l∗|l2) ∀l1, l2, l∗ ∈ L (1)
where P (l∗|l) is the probability of obfuscating l to l∗,
d(l1, l2) is the distance between l1 and l2,  is the privacy
budget — the smaller , the better privacy protection.
Note that the set of locations are usually constructed
by dividing the target area into subregions, e.g., equal-size
grids (Bordenabe, Chatzikokolakis, and Palamidessi 2014)
or cell-tower regions (Xiong et al. 2016).
If P satisfies geographic differential privacy, it can be
proven that for adversaries with any prior knowledge about
users’ location distributions, their posterior knowledge af-
ter observing the obfuscated location can only be increased
by a small constant factor (Andre´s et al. 2013). Note that
this protection is guaranteed even if the adversaries know P .
Due to this rigorous protection effect, geographic differen-
tial privacy has seen many applications in location based ser-
vices, spatial crowdsourcing, etc. (Bordenabe, Chatzikoko-
lakis, and Palamidessi 2014; Wang et al. 2016; Wang et al.
2017).
Mobility profiling aims to estimate the probability of
a user covering a certain location during a time period in
the future. Specifically, a user ui’s mobility profile is de-
noted as Mi, and Mi(lj), lj ∈ L means the estimated
probability of ui visiting lj in a concerned future period
(e.g., next week). Commonly used mobility profiling meth-
ods include frequency-based (Guo et al. 2017) and Poisson-
based (Xiong et al. 2016) algorithms. We use the Poisson
process to model user mobility given its better prediction
performance in our experiments. More details can be found
in the appendix.
Framework Overview
We present an overview of our privacy framework in Fig-
ure 1. The key idea of our framework is that users should
expose their location information as little as possible, while
we can still select a proper set of users for optimizing their
coverage on certain target locations in the future.
The two main players in our framework are a server plat-
form and its mobile client users. As we want users to ex-
pose their actual location information as little as possible,
user mobility profiling runs locally on individuals’ smart
devices. That means, the clients’ mobility profiles are only
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Figure 1: Framework overview.
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Figure 2: A running example of our framework.
known to themselves. As shown in the literature, only up-
loading frequent locations with high profiling probabilities
(e.g., > 80%) to the server can already help achieve a good
future crowd coverage (Guo et al. 2017). To limit the poten-
tial location leakage, our framework only requires users to
upload one of their frequent locations. Moreover, this fre-
quent location is obfuscated by the geographic differential
privacy policy P before being sent to the platform. The pol-
icy P is generated by the server based on which target loca-
tions need to be covered. Finally, according to the uploaded
obfuscated frequent locations {l∗1 · · · l∗N} (supposeN users),
the platform aims to select a set of users to maximize the ex-
pected coverage of intended locations in the coming period.
A running example is shown in Figure 2, where the table
represents a user’s mobility profile in a 2D spatial area split-
ted into uniform grids. Suppose that a location-based adver-
tising platform needs to decide whether to send a Starbucks
coupon to a user. The platform expects that a user receiving
the coupon is a frequent visitor to the regions where Star-
bucks stores are located, so that the user will probably go
to the stores. To achieve this goal, first, a user client com-
putes its owner’s mobility profile locally. Second, from the
set of locations whose probabilities are larger than a thresh-
old (e.g., 80%), the user client randomly selects one location
lu to be uploaded to the server.1 Third, according to the pri-
vacy policy P received from the server, the user client ran-
domly obfuscates lu to l∗u and then sends l
∗
u to the server.
1If there is no location with the probability larger than the
threshold, then the user does not upload any location.
Finally, the server will decide whether to send the coupon to
the user or not according to the uploaded l∗u. In this case, a
user’s location privacy is preserved as the uploaded frequent
location is rigorously obfuscated with differential privacy.
Location obfuscation would inevitably introduce certain
loss of quality in selecting users for coverage optimiza-
tion, as users’ uploaded frequent locations contain deliberate
noises. Hence, how the server generates the privacy policy P
is the key challenge of our framework, which aims to mini-
mize the loss of quality caused by privacy protection.
Optimal Privacy Policy
In this section, we illustrate our solution that guarantees ge-
ographic -differential privacy while minimizing the loss of
quality in mobile crowd coverage optimization.
Single Location Coverage Problem (SLCP)
As the first step, we analyze the scenario where only one
location needs to be covered. In location-based advertising,
this reflects the scenario that the advertising only involves
one specific site (e.g., a newly opened restaurant). In spatial
crowdsourcing, this means that the task is only associated
with one location (e.g., taking the photo of Statue of Lib-
erty). Suppose the target location to cover as lt and a user
submits her/his obfuscated frequent location as l∗, then the
probability of her/his frequent location being actually lt is:
prob(lt|l∗) = pi(lt)P (l
∗|lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)P (l∗|l)
(2)
where pi is the overall distribution of all the users’ frequent
locations. Here we suppose that we can foreknow pi, and
later we will elaborate how to estimate it. Note that the de-
nominator can be seen as the overall probability of a user
reporting her/his frequent location as l∗.
Suppose we select a user reporting lˆ∗ to cover the target
location lt in the coming time period, apparently we would
like to maximize Eq. 2 so that the future probability of the
user covering lt is maximized. With this idea, we have the
following optimization process to get the optimal privacy
policy Pˆ . Particularly, given lt to cover, we aim to
max
lˆ∗,Pˆ
pi(lt)Pˆ (lˆ
∗|lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)Pˆ (lˆ∗|l)
(3)
s.t. Pˆ (l∗|l1) ≤ ed(l1,l2)Pˆ (l∗|l2) ∀l1, l2, l∗ ∈ L (4)
Pˆ (l∗|l) > 0 ∀l, l∗ ∈ L (5)∑
l∗∈L
Pˆ (l∗|l) = 1 ∀l ∈ L (6)
Eq. 4 is the constraint of geographic differential privacy;
Eq. 5 and 6 are probability restrictions. By solving the above
optimization problem, we can get the optimal privacy policy
Pˆ , as well as the user selection strategy, i.e., selecting the
users reporting lˆ∗ for future coverage maximization.
However, even given lˆ∗, Eq. 3 cannot be converted to a
convex optimization problem with existing solutions (Boyd
and Vandenberghe 2004). To overcome this difficulty, we
then analyze the relationship between the constraints and the
objective function, and then deduce an optimal solution an-
alytically.
An Analytic Solution to SLCP
Our analytic deduction includes three steps. First, we verify
that the selection of lˆ∗ will not affect the optimal objective
value of Eq. 3. Second, we prove that Eq. 3 cannot exceed a
certain upper bound. Finally, we show that this upper bound
can be achieved by constructing a feasible solution of Pˆ .
Lemma 1. For any two locations l∗1, l∗2 ∈ L, the optimal
objective values of Eq. 3 are the same if we set lˆ∗ = l∗1 or l
∗
2 .
Proof. For lˆ∗ = l∗1 or l
∗
2 , we can always find a pair of
P1, P2, where P1(l∗1|l) = P2(l∗2|l), P1(l∗2|l) = P2(l∗1|l), and
P1(l
∗|l) = P2(l∗|l) for other l∗; P1 and P2 lead to the same
objective value. A detailed proof is in the appendix.
Remark. Lemma 1 demonstrates that we can use any lo-
cation l ∈ L as the obfuscated location lˆ∗ for user selection
without impacting the achievable optimal coverage utility.
Lemma 2. The optimal value of Eq. 3 cannot exceed
pi(lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)e−d(l,lt)
(7)
and this value can only be achieved if
Pˆ (lˆ∗|l) ∝ e−d(l,lt), ∀l ∈ L (8)
Proof. With geographic differential privacy constraints,
pi(lt)Pˆ (lˆ
∗|lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)Pˆ (lˆ∗|l)
=
pi(lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)
Pˆ (lˆ∗|l)
Pˆ (lˆ∗|lt)
(9)
≤ pi(lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)
e−d(l,lt)Pˆ (lˆ∗|lt)
Pˆ (lˆ∗|lt)
=
pi(lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)e−d(l,lt)
(10)
Remark. Lemma 2 points out an upper bound of the op-
timal objective value and the condition (Eq. 8) that Pˆ must
satisfy for getting the upper bound value. However, whether
we can find a feasible Pˆ satisfying Eq. 8, as well as Eq. 4-6
is still unknown. Next, we prove that this Pˆ exists.
Lemma 3. If Pˆ (lˆ∗|l) satisfies Eq. 8, then
Pˆ (lˆ∗|l1) ≤ ed(l1,l2)Pˆ (lˆ∗|l2) ∀l1, l2 ∈ L (11)
Proof. Considering that d is a distance metric, then
Pˆ (lˆ∗|l1)
Pˆ (lˆ∗|l2)
= e(d(l2,lt)−d(l1,lt)) ≤ ed(l1,l2) (12)
Remark. Lemma 3 proves that when Eq. 8 stands, Eq. 4
of l∗ = lˆ∗ must also hold for any l1, l2.
Theorem 1. Given any lˆ∗, we can get a feasible Pˆ ,
Pˆ (lˆ∗|l) = θe−d(l,lt), ∀l ∈ L (13)
Pˆ (l∗|l) = 1− θe
−d(l,lt)
|L| − 1 , ∀l
∗, l ∈ L and l∗ 6= lˆ∗ (14)
which can achieve the upper bound Eq. 7. Here, θ can be any
positive constant value smaller than or equal to a threshold
τ , where
τ = min
l1,l2∈L
ed(l1,l2) − 1
e−(d(l2,lt)−d(l1,l2)) − e−d(l1,lt) (15)
The proof is in the appendix.
Note that while Theorem 1 gets an optimal solution, in re-
ality, there may not be enough users who report lˆ∗ for selec-
tion (if τ is too small and the total user number is limited).
Later we will propose a practical solution overcoming this
shortcoming, when addressing the multi-location scenario.
Multi-Location Coverage Problem (MLCP)
A more complicated setting for mobile crowd coverage
problem includes a set of locations that need to be cov-
ered. Real-life examples include delivering coupons of chain
stores to users who will probably visit any of them in the
next time period. Denote the set of locations to cover as
L = {l1t , l2t , ..., lzt } ⊂ L (16)
then the probability of a user’s actual frequent location be-
longing to L is:∑
lt∈L
prob(lt|l∗) =
∑
lt∈L pi(lt)P (l
∗|lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)P (l∗|l)
(17)
Then, we can maximize Eq. 17 with the constraints Eq. 4-
6 to get the optimal privacy policy Pˆ , and the obfuscated
location lˆ∗ for future crowd coverage maximization.
max
lˆ∗,Pˆ
∑
lt∈L pi(lt)Pˆ (lˆ
∗|lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)Pˆ (lˆ∗|l)
(18)
s.t. Eq. 4− 6 (19)
Similar to the single location coverage problem, we can
prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 4. For any l∗1, l∗2 ∈ L, the optimal objective val-
ues of Eq. 18 are the same if we set lˆ∗ = l∗1 or l
∗
2 .
Lemma 4 is a straightforward extension of Lemma 1 to the
multiple location coverage scenario.
Lemma 5. The optimal value of Eq. 18 cannot exceed
(1 +
∑
l 6∈L
∑
lt∈L
pi(l)
pi(lt)
e−d(l,lt))−1 (20)
and this value can be achieved only if
ed(l,lt)P (lˆ∗|l) = P (lˆ∗|lt), ∀lt ∈ L,∀l 6∈ L (21)
The detailed proof is in the appendix.
Although Lemma 5 seems to be an extension of Lemma
2 for the multi-location scenario, they have a significant dif-
ference that the optimal value Eq. 20 may not always be fea-
sible, i.e., Eq. 21 may not stand. Take a toy example of L
containing two locations, it means that, for any l 6∈ L
ed(l,l
1
t )P (lˆ∗|l) = P (lˆ∗|l1t ) (22)
ed(l,l
2
t )P (lˆ∗|l) = P (lˆ∗|l2t ) (23)
l1 lt1
lt2 l2
l1 lt1
l2 lt2
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Toy examples with two locations to cover.
Then, for any two locations l1, l2 6∈ L, let l = l1 or l2, then
P (lˆ∗|l1t )
P (lˆ∗|l2t )
=
ed(l1,l
1
t )
ed(l1,l
2
t )
=
ed(l2,l
1
t )
ed(l2,l
2
t )
(24)
⇒ d(l1, l1t )− d(l1, l2t ) = d(l2, l1t )− d(l2, l2t ) (25)
Hence, if Eq. 20 is feasible, Eq. 25 must hold. Figure 3
shows two examples, in one of which Eq. 25 stands (Fig-
ure 3a) and the other does not (Figure 3b, considering the
Euclidean distance). This shows that whether Eq. 20 can be
achieved depends on the distribution of the target locations.
A Practical Solution to MLCP
While we cannot always obtain the upper bound value of
Eq. 20 for the multi-location coverage problem, here we pro-
pose a practical solution which can work in real scenarios.
Revisiting the objective function of the multi-location
coverage problem, Eq. 18, we can see that the main difficulty
in solving the optimization problem is that the denominator
includes Pˆ in it. To address this issue, we propose to add
one more constraint to the optimization process by setting
the denominator to a constant value,∑
l∈L
pi(l)Pˆ (lˆ∗|l) = β (26)
where β is a constant between 0 and 1; we will later elabo-
rate how to set β. With Eq. 26, the objective function is,
max
lˆ∗,Pˆ
∑
lt∈L pi(lt)Pˆ (lˆ
∗|lt)
β
(27)
Lemma 4 has shown that we can set lˆ∗ to any l ∈ L with-
out affecting the optimal objective value. Since Eq. 4-6 are
all linear constraints, we can then use state-of-the-art linear
programming tools (e.g., Mosek and Gurobi) to solve the
optimization problem to get the optimal privacy policy Pˆ .
Setting β with Binomial Distribution. We then discuss
how to set β in real-life scenarios. First, we prove that if we
want to get the objective value as high as possible, we should
set β as small as possible.
Theorem 2. Given lˆ∗, suppose v1, v2 are the two optimal
objective values of Eq. 27 when we set β to b1, b2, respec-
tively, and b1 < b2, then v1 ≥ v2.
Proof. We denote the optimal Pˆ when setting β to b1, b2
as Pˆ1, Pˆ2, respectively. Then, we construct a new solution of
P ′1 when β = b1 as follows:
P ′1(lˆ
∗|l) = θPˆ2(lˆ∗|l) ∀l ∈ L
P ′1(l
′|l) = Pˆ2(l′|l) + (1− θ)Pˆ2(lˆ′|l) ∀l ∈ L, l′ 6= lˆ∗
Algorithm 1: Optimal policy for multi-location coverage.
Input : pi: overall user spatial distribution.
: differential privacy budget.
L: whole set of locations.
L: set of target locations to cover.
N : total number of users.
α: number of users to select.
ρ: probability threshold for user selection.
Output: Pˆ : optimal differential privacy policy.
lˆ∗: the obfuscated location to select users.
1 lˆ∗ ← l1 (or any other l ∈ L) ;
2 β ← the minimum value that can ensure Pr(X ≥ α) ≥ ρ for the
Binomial distributionB(X,N, β);
3 Solve the linear program to get optimal Pˆ :
max
Pˆ
∑
lt∈L pi(lt)Pˆ (lˆ
∗|lt)
β
s.t. Pˆ (l
∗|l1) ≤ ed(l1,l2)Pˆ (l∗|l2) ∀l1, l2, l∗ ∈ L
Pˆ (l
∗|l) > 0 ∀l, l∗ ∈ L∑
l∗∈L
Pˆ (l
∗|l) = 1 ∀l ∈ L
∑
l∈L
pi(l)Pˆ (lˆ
∗|l) = β
4 return lˆ∗, Pˆ ;
where θ = b1/b2. All the constraints of Eq. 4-6 still stand
for P ′1. As the optimal objective value is v1 when β = b1,
v1 ≥
∑
lt∈L pi(lt)P
′
1(lˆ
∗|lt)
b1
=
∑
lt∈L pi(lt)Pˆ2(lˆ
∗|lt)
b2
= v2
Theorem 2 is very important for our practical solution, be-
cause it tells us that to get the optimal solution, we only need
to solve the linear program once by setting β to the small-
est value that we can accept, rather than enumerating all the
possible β. On the other hand, β can be seen as the overall
probability that a user will report her/his frequent location as
lˆ∗. Since we need to select users from such users, we cannot
set β to a too small value, which will lead to very few peo-
ple reporting their locations as lˆ∗. Therefore, we propose a
method to set β, with a guarantee that the platform can find
α users with a probability of ρ (e.g., 95%) as follows.
Suppose totally N users report their frequent locations,
then we can estimate the number of users who will report
their obfuscated frequent locations as lˆ∗ with the Binomial
probability Pr(X = m) = B(m,N, β). Then, the proba-
bility that we can find at least α users is that,
Pr(X ≥ α) =
N∑
m=α
B(m,N, β) (28)
And thus we would like to set β to the smallest value that
ensures Pr(X ≥ α) ≥ ρ.
We describe the pseudo-code of our practical solution for
the private multi-location coverage problem in Algorithm 1.
Note that since covering one location is a special case of
covering multiple locations, Algorithm 1 can also solve the
single location coverage problem, without the need to as-
sume that we will always have enough users reporting lˆ∗.
Algorithm 2: User selection with dynamic estimating pi.
Input : k: number of user groups to split.
other inputs like Algorithm 1, except that pi is unknown.
Output: U∗: selected users.
1 pi ← uniform distribution (or other proper initial distribution);
2 U1, U2, ..., Uk ←N users are split into k groups, each withN/k users;
3 for i = 1, 2, ..., k do
4 lˆ∗, Pˆ ← run Algorithm 1 with pi;
5 foreach u ∈ Ui do
/* u downloads Pˆ to the mobile client */
6 lu ← a randomly selected frequent location;
7 l∗u ← obfuscating lu by Pˆ ;
/* u uploads l
∗
u to the server */
8 pi′u(l)←
pi(l)Pˆ (l∗u|l)∑
l′∈L pi(l′)Pˆ (l∗u|l′)
, ∀l ∈ L;
9 end
10 pi ← the mean value of pi′u over u ∈ Ui;
11 end
12 U∗ ← ∅;
13 for j = k, k − 1, ..., 1 do
14 foreach u ∈ Uj do
15 if u’s obfuscated location is lˆ∗ then
16 U∗ ← U∗ ∪ {u};
17 if |U∗| == α then
18 return U∗;
19 end
20 end
21 end
22 end
23 return U∗;
Estimating Overall Location Distribution pi. Previously,
we assume that we have known the overall frequent loca-
tion distribution pi. This may be possible when we have
other sources to infer pi, e.g., mobile call logs (Blondel et
al. 2012). However, if we do not have such data, other meth-
ods are required to estimate pi along with user selection. We
thus propose a Bayes rule based method to do user selection
and pi estimation simultaneously, as shown in Algorithm 2.
Our basic idea is using users’ uploaded obfuscated loca-
tions to refine pi. Note that our mechanism requires that each
user uploads the obfuscated location only once to ensure
differential privacy protection (Andre´s et al. 2013). Hence,
to preserve differential privacy, we split all the users into
k groups, get users’ obfuscated locations group by group,
and iteratively refine pi with the obfuscated locations from
previous user groups. The key update formula of pi is the
Bayes rule in line 8. In such a way, the estimated pi grad-
ually reaches the actual pi after iterative refinements. As pi
generally becomes more and more accurate, the final user
selection is biased to the users in the groups who upload lo-
cations later (line 13-22). The number of groups k balances
the trade-off between algorithm running efficiency and solu-
tion quality — larger k updates pi more frequently, but costs
more time as it involves k iterations of running Algorithm 1.
Note that in real implementation, users who do not have
any frequent locations can still upload ‘NULL’ to the server.
Then, we can estimate the percentage of users who can re-
port locations from previous user groups. This can help us to
set an appropriate β used in the optimization so as to finally
find α users with a probability of ρ.
(a) New York (b) Hangzhou (c) Abidjan
Figure 4: Experiment areas. Points in NY and Hangzhou are
user locations, and points in Abidjan are cell towers.
Experiments
In this section, we conduct empirical studies on three real
user mobility datasets. We use Algorithm 2 for both single
and multi-location coverage scenarios given its practicality
(no need to foreknow pi).
Baselines
• Laplace. The state-of-the-art method to achieve geo-
graphic differential privacy is based on the Laplace dis-
tribution (Andre´s et al. 2013).
• NO. We use the No-Obfuscation (NO) policy, i.e., the
users upload one of their real frequent locations to the
server, to show an upper bound of the coverage.
• Random. We use the random user selection to serve as the
lower bound of the coverage that can be achieved.
Datasets
• FS dataset (Yang et al. 2016) contains 1083 Foursquare
users’ check-ins in New York, USA across near one year.
We set the time period to a weekly granularity, that is, the
selected users are expected to visit the target locations in
the next week. The studied area (Figure 10a) is split into
1km*1km grids. Among the 45 weeks of user mobility
data, we use the last five weeks as the test time period,
and first 40 weeks for mobility profiling.
• CMCC dataset contains 1315 users’ GPS trajectories in
Hangzhou, China, for one month from one mobile op-
erator. The time period is set to a daily granularity. The
studied area (Figure 10b) is split into 1km*1km grids. We
use the first 18 weekdays for mobility profiling and the
remaining four weekdays for testing.
• D4D dataset (Blondel et al. 2012) includes 5378 users’
two-week mobile phone call logs with cell tower locations
in Abidjan, Coˆte d’Ivoire. The time period is set to a daily
granularity. The studied area (Figure 10c) is split into cell-
tower-based regions (Xiong et al. 2016; Wang et al. 2017).
We use the first nine weekdays for mobility profiling and
the last one weekday for testing.
Table 1 summarizes the experimental parameters. Note
that the default differential privacy budget  is set to ln(4)
as suggested by the original paper (Andre´s et al. 2013).
Results on FS
Single Location Coverage. We first evaluate the scenario
where only one location (grid) needs to be covered. Our
Table 1: Experimental parameters.
Notation Values Description
 ln(2), ln(4), ln(6), ln(8) differential privacy level
δ 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 threshold for frequent locations
N 1083 (FS), 1315 (CMCC) total number of users
5378 (D4D)
α 5%·N number of selected users
ρ 95% probability for user selection
k 6 number of user groups
A
B
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
(A) dense (B) moderate
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
NO Our Laplace Random
Figure 5: Experiment of single location coverage on two dif-
ferent populated locations on FS ( = ln(4), δ = 0.7).
evaluation metric is the probability that a selected user will
actually appear at the target location in the next week.
Figure 5 shows the results on two target locations with
different population sizes when  = ln(4) and δ = 0.7.
In both target locations, our proposed method can achieve
a larger coverage probability (up to 5% improvement) than
the Laplace mechanism. Compared to the no-obfuscation
method, the coverage probability of our method drops from
32.9% to 21.7% for the densely populated target location.
For the less densely populated one, the drop is bigger (from
30.5% to 14.5%). A possible explanation is that when the
target location is densely populated, even if our mechanism
mis-selects a user whose frequent location is not the target
one, s/he still may go to the target location by chance.
Figure 6a illustrates how the coverage probability changes
when we vary the privacy budget  for the densely populated
target location. As a trade-off between privacy and coverage,
when  increases (i.e., lower level of privacy), we can get a
higher coverage probability. More specifically, the improve-
ment of our method over Laplace is more significant for a
lower , i.e., higher privacy protection guarantee.
Figure 6b shows the change of coverage probability when
the threshold of frequent locations δ varies. The coverage
probabilities of all the methods rise with the increase of δ.
While a higher δ benefits coverage probability, the number
of users who can upload their (obfuscated) frequent loca-
tions (i.e., candidates for selection) is smaller, because only
users with at least one location profiling probability larger
than δ will upload frequent locations. Based on experiment
results, setting δ to around 0.7-0.8 is appropriate for our
method, as the coverage probability is relatively satisfactory
while a large portion of users can be involved.
Multi-Location Coverage. We evaluate the scenario
where multiple target locations exist. We randomly select 2,
4, 6 and 8 locations as the targets. Figure 7 shows the actual
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Figure 6: Single location coverage results on FS.
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Figure 7: Multi-location cov-
erage results on FS.
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Figure 8: Results of estimat-
ing pi on FS.
coverage probability that we can get, i.e., the probabilities of
selected users covering any one of the target locations in the
coming week. The results show that our proposed method
consistently outperforms Laplace under the same level of
privacy protection. Moreover, with an increasing number of
the target locations, we find that the performance gap be-
tween our method and no-obfuscation becomes smaller. This
indicates that, when there are more locations to cover, us-
ing our mechanism is more profitable, as the performance
loss incurred by the geographic differential privacy protec-
tion becomes smaller.
Estimation of pi. We evaluate whether our proposed
Bayes rule based method can estimate pi correctly. We use
KL divergence (Kullback and Leibler 1951) to quantify the
similarity between the estimated pi and the actual pi. The
smaller KL divergence is, the more similar they are. Figure 8
shows the change of KL divergence with k (the number of
user groups), and pi is initialized to a uniform distribution.
In Figure 8, k = 0 represents the KL divergence between
the uniform and the actual distribution. When k is small, we
have fewer iterations to update pi, leading to a larger KL di-
vergence. In our experiment, k = 6 is a good setting, as KL
divergence achieves a relatively low value, while the algo-
rithm can complete execution within a reasonable time.
Runtime Efficiency. We use Gurobi 7.5 (Gurobi 2014) as
the linear programming solver engine to run Algorithm 1 for
getting the optimal policy Pˆ . It takes about 450 seconds on
a commodity laptop with i5-5200U (2.2 GHz), 8G memory.
We split all the users to six groups, meaning that Algorithm 1
is executed six times, which sums up to about 45 minutes. As
the optimal privacy policy generation can be an offline pro-
cess, such runtime efficiency is totally acceptable for real
applications. Note that this running time is not affected by
the number of users, so our method can serve mobile appli-
cations with a large number of users.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1 2 4 8
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
number of locations to cover
NO Our
Laplace Random
(a) CMCC (Hangzhou)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
1 2 4 8
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
number of locations to cover
NO Our
Laplace Random
(b) D4D (Abidjan)
Figure 9: Experiment results on CMCC and D4D with dif-
ferent number of locations to cover ( = ln(4), δ = 0.8).
Results on CMCC and D4D
To test the robustness of our proposed method, we also con-
duct experiments on CMCC and D4D datasets. The results
are shown in Figure 9a and 9b, where we randomly select
1, 2, 4, and 8 locations to cover. The results verify that our
proposed method can always outperform the Laplace mech-
anism in attaining a higher coverage probability of the se-
lected users. Moreover, the results show that when the num-
ber of target locations to cover increases to 8, our privacy
mechanism almost achieves the same coverage probability
as no-obfuscation, especially for the D4D dataset. This fur-
ther emphasizes the practicability of our mechanism, as user
privacy is gained with a nearly negligible quality loss. Note
that the achieved coverage probability on D4D is smaller
than FS or CMCC in general, because the phone call lo-
cations on D4D are intrinsically more difficult to predict.
Please refer to the appendix for detailed mobility prediction
results.
Related Work
Selecting a set of users who can cover a set of locations in
the near future is a very important problem for real applica-
tions like spatial crowdsourcing (Chen and Shahabi 2016;
Zhang et al. 2014) and location-based advertising (Dhar
and Varshney 2011). In most of previous research works,
users’ moving histories are known and hence their mo-
bility patterns can be effectively modeled for predicting
their future locations (Xiong et al. 2016; Guo et al. 2017;
Yang et al. 2015).
As user privacy is becoming more and more im-
portant nowadays, some pioneering works have started
to model users’ mobility or activity patterns based on
privacy-preserving data. Geo-indistinguishability mecha-
nisms are proposed for location-based query systems where
users can submit their differentially obfuscated locations
(Andre´s et al. 2013; Bordenabe, Chatzikokolakis, and
Palamidessi 2014). PrivCheck is designed to enable person-
alized location-based advertising or recommendation with
obfuscated user check-ins, so that users’ sensitive infor-
mation (e.g., age and gender) cannot be inferred by ad-
versaries (Yang et al. 2016). In spatial crowdsourcing data
acquisition, recent works also incorporate privacy mecha-
nisms to protect participants’ precise locations (Wang et al.
2016; Wang et al. 2017; To, Ghinita, and Shahabi 2014;
Vergara-Laurens, Mendez, and Labrador 2014; Pournajaf
et al. 2014). While these studies have various applica-
tions, they usually focus on obfuscating users’ current lo-
cations. As far as we know, little previous work has studied
the privacy-preserving future crowd coverage maximization
problem based on users’ obfuscated historical mobility pro-
files which we specifically focus on in this paper.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study the crowd coverage maximization
problem under the privacy protection on user locations. The
key idea is to select users who will probably visit certain
locations in near future with their differentially obfuscated
locations. To maximize the quality (coverage probability)
of selected users under such a privacy protection scheme,
an optimization problem is formulated to obtain the opti-
mal privacy policy. We mathematically analyze the problem,
and then propose a practical algorithm to obtain the optimal
privacy policy. Experiments on various real user mobility
datasets have verified the effectiveness of our privacy mech-
anism. As future work, we plan to study the problem when
a user can upload multiple obfuscated frequent locations.
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Appendix
Detailed Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose we have two different lˆ∗, i.e., l∗1, l
∗
2 ∈ L, and get
two different optimal objective values
pi(lt)Pˆ1(lˆ
∗
1|lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)Pˆ1(lˆ
∗
1|l)
<
pi(lt)Pˆ2(lˆ
∗
2|lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)Pˆ2(lˆ
∗
2|l)
We now construct a new solution of Pˆ ′1 when lˆ
∗ = l∗1 as
follows:
Pˆ ′1(l
∗
1|l) = Pˆ2(l∗2|l), ∀l ∈ L
Pˆ ′1(l
∗
2|l) = Pˆ2(l∗1|l), ∀l ∈ L
Pˆ ′1(l
∗|l) = Pˆ2(l∗|l), l∗ 6= l∗1, l∗ 6= l∗2,∀l ∈ L
We can verify that all the constraints of the optimization still
stand, and then Pˆ ′1 is a feasible solution when lˆ
∗ = l∗1 , and
then
pi(lt)Pˆ
′
1(lˆ
∗
1|lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)Pˆ
′
1(lˆ
∗
1|l)
=
pi(lt)Pˆ2(lˆ
∗
2|lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)Pˆ2(lˆ
∗
2|l)
>
pi(lt)Pˆ1(lˆ
∗
1|lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)Pˆ1(lˆ
∗
1|l)
This violates that Pˆ1 is the optimal solution when lˆ∗ = lˆ∗1 .
Detailed Proof of Theorem 1
With the following way to construct Pˆ ,
Pˆ (lˆ∗|l) = θe−d(l,lt), ∀l ∈ L (29)
Pˆ (l∗|l) = 1− θe
−d(l,lt)
|L| − 1 , ∀l
∗, l ∈ L and l∗ 6= lˆ∗ (30)
Then, for any l ∈ L,∑
l∗∈L
Pˆ (l∗|l) = θe−d(l,lt) + (|L| − 1)1− θe
−d(l,lt)
|L| − 1 = 1
So the probability sum constraint stands. We then prove that
differential privacy constraint also stands. Note that Lemma
3 has proved that the differential privacy constraint holds if
l∗ = lˆ∗. Therefore, we only need to show that the differential
privacy constraint also stands for l∗ 6= lˆ∗. Next, we show
how to select θ to ensure that this is true for any l∗ 6= lˆ∗,
Pˆ (l∗|l1)
Pˆ (l∗|l2)
=
1− θe−d(l1,lt)
1− θe−d(l2,lt) ≤ e
d(l1,l2) (31)
⇒ θ ≤ e
d(l1,l2) − 1
e−(d(l2,lt)−d(l1,l2)) − e−d(l1,lt) (32)
It is worth noting that both the numerator and denominator
in the right side of Eq. 32 are larger than zero when  > 0.
Hence, we can set θ to any positive value smaller than or
equal to
min
l1,l2∈L
ed(l1,l2) − 1
e−(d(l2,lt)−d(l1,l2)) − e−d(l1,lt) (33)
and then for any l∗ 6= lˆ∗, geographic differential privacy
still holds. Then, based on Lemma 2, we can know that the
Pˆ satisfying Eq. 29 and 30 can lead to the upper bound of
the objective value.
Detailed Proof of Lemma 5
According to the geographic differential privacy constraints,
we have
ed(l,lt)P (lˆ∗|l) ≥ P (lˆ∗|lt), l 6∈ L and lt ∈ L (34)
⇒ pi(lt)ed(l,lt)P (lˆ∗|l) ≥ pi(lt)P (lˆ∗|lt), l 6∈ L and lt ∈ L
(35)
⇒
∑
lt∈L
pi(lt)e
d(l,lt)P (lˆ∗|l) ≥
∑
lt∈L
pi(lt)P (lˆ
∗|lt), l 6∈ L
(36)
⇒ P (lˆ∗|l) ≥
∑
lt∈L pi(lt)P (lˆ
∗|lt)∑
lt∈L pi(lt)e
d(l,lt)
, l 6∈ L (37)
Then, ∑
lt∈L pi(lt)P (l
∗|lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)P (l∗|l)
(38)
=
∑
lt∈L pi(lt)P (l
∗|lt)∑
lt∈L pi(lt)P (l
∗|lt) +
∑
l 6∈L pi(l)P (l∗|l)
(39)
For the ease of presentation, we denote C =∑
lt∈L pi(lt)P (l
∗|lt),∑
lt∈L pi(lt)P (l
∗|lt)∑
l∈L pi(l)P (l∗|l)
(40)
=
C
C +
∑
l 6∈L pi(l)P (l∗|l)
(41)
≤ C
C +
∑
l 6∈L pi(l)
C∑
lt∈L pi(lt)e
d(l,lt)
(42)
=(1 +
∑
l 6∈L
∑
lt∈L
pi(l)
pi(lt)
e−d(l,lt))−1 (43)
Mobility Profiling
We consider two popular mobility profiling methods used in
literature, and choose the better one in our experiments.
(1) Frequency (Guo et al. 2017). This method counts
daily (or weekly) frequency that a user visits a location in
her/his historical mobility records. For example, suppose we
have a user’s 7-day mobility history and s/he visits a location
li in 5 days, then the daily visiting probability is 5/7.
(2) Poisson (Xiong et al. 2016). Given a user u’s average
daily (or weekly) visiting times to location li in the past,
denoted as λu,i, then the Poisson process estimates that u
visits li at least once in one day (week) is:
pu,i = 1− e−λu,i (44)
Figure 10 plots the receiver operating characteristics
(ROC) curves (Fawcett 2006) and shows the area under
the ROC curve (AUC) values for both profiling methods
on the FS, CMCC, and D4D datasets, respectively. The
larger AUC value implies better performance in predicting a
user’s future mobility patterns. From the results, we see that
(a) New York (FS) (b) Hangzhou (CMCC) (c) Abidjan (D4D)
Figure 10: ROC curves of mobility profiling.
Poisson-based mobility profiling method beats Frequency-
based method, and thus we use the Poisson-based method in
all the experiments.
In addition, we observe that the mobility prediction on the
D4D dataset is more difficult than on the other two datasets,
as it gets a lower AUC value. As expected, our experiments
in the paper (Figure 9) show that the selected users on the
D4D dataset achieve a lower coverage probability than the
other two datasets with the same user selection mechanism.
